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Abstract
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) has been promoted as a way to
strengthen citizens’ participation in EU lawmaking. Taking stock of the
ECI’s first few years of operation, this article aims to identify the influence
of the ECI on EU lawmaking and its position in the EU institutional
triangle (Commission – European Parliament – Council). In particular,
the article examines whether the ECI has shifted the EU institutional
status quo vis-à-vis the Commission’s power of legislative initiative. It
focuses on the first few ECIs that have managed to collect the necessary
number of signatures to be formally considered by the Commission, and
evaluates the Commission’s discretion to respond to these ECIs. It argues
that there is currently a mismatch between, on one hand, the expectations
of EU citizens from the ECI and, on the other hand, the ECI’s capacity to
lead to legislative output. The article addresses the challenges that arise
from this mismatch.
1. Introduction
The past year has seen a surge in the use of citizens’ participatory mechanisms
in EU Member States. For example, referendums took place in the
Netherlands, the UK, and Hungary on significant EU-related matters
(association agreements between the EU and third countries, EU membership,
and migrant quotas respectively), giving people an opportunity, additional to
electoral voting, to participate in politics. An opportunity for citizens’
participation in decision making beyond voting also exists at the EU level, in
the form of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). The ECI enables
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EU citizens, after collecting one million signatures, to request the European
Commission to consider an idea as a possible basis for a legislative proposal.
Even if ECI organizers manage to collect the necessary signatures of support,
the Commission is not formally obliged to act on the submitted proposal. Yet
as a mechanism that allows citizens to propose legislation to the Commission,
the ECI is inextricably linked with the Commission’s power of legislative
initiative.
This article presents an account of the ECI’s potential to affect EU
legislation, along with an analysis of the Commission’s approach to
successful ECIs to date. It argues that, while the ECI has been considered as a
new opportunity and force of legislative initiative, in reality its potential is
weak as a means of influencing EU legislative output. The article addresses
this challenge, explicating its background and advancing the debate on
citizens’ participation in EU lawmaking. To this effect, the analysis focuses on
a specific aspect of the ECI’s lifecycle, namely the “follow-up” of an ECI,
which is the stage that succeeds the 12-month signature collection phase and
entails the decision by the Commission on how to react to the proposals of an
ECI that managed to collect one million signatures from seven different
Member States as stipulated in Regulation 211/2011 (the ECI Regulation).1
Although issues concerning the ECI’s burdensome legislative framework,
its potential to foster an emerging European public sphere, and its relevance to
the (missing) European demos, have attracted the interest of academic
commentators, there has been less attention to the extent to which ECIs have
actually influenced the Commission’s near-monopoly of legislative
initiative.2 Instead, commentators often see the non-binding nature of the ECI
as the end of the story when it comes to the effect of this participatory
mechanism on EU legislation.3 This article contributes to the debate by
1. Regulation (EU) 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Feb.
2011 on the citizens’ initiative, O.J. 2011, L 65/1.
2. E.g. Dougan, “What are we to make of the Citizens’ Initiative?”, 48 CML Rev. (2011),
1807–1848; Ferro, “Popular legislative initiative in the EU: Alea iacta est”, 26 YEL (2007),
354–385; Karatzia, “The European Citizens’ Initiative in practice: Legal admissibility
concerns”, 40 EL Rev. (2015), 509–530; Bouza, Garcia and Greenwood, “The European
Citizens’ Initiative: A new sphere of EU politics?”, (2014) Interest Groups and Advocacy,
246–267; Langer, “Die Europäische Bürgerinitiative: Partizipativer placebo oder
direktdemokratischer keimling?” in Kübler and Stojanovic (Eds.), Demokratie in der
Europäischen Union (Schulthess, 2014), pp. 141–161.
3. For the most recent contributions discussing the ECI from an empirical perspective see:
Conrad, Knaut and Bottger (Eds.), Bridging the Gap? Opportunities and Constraints of the
European Citizens’ Initiative (Nomos, 2016); Marxen, “Participatory democracy in Europe –
Article 11 TEU and the legitimacy of the European Union” in Fabbrini, Ballin and Somsen
(Eds.),What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart, 2015), pp.
151–169; Bussaguet, “Participatory mechanisms as symbolic policy instruments?”, 14
Comparative European Politics (2015), 1–18.
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examining whether the ECI has proved to be a new opportunity and force for
legislative initiative in the EU. In doing this, the analysis below illustrates how
the ECI has blended into the EU’s institutional balance, and what this says
about the way in which Article 11(4) TEU (citizens’ participation via an ECI)
currently complements Article 10(2) TEU (citizens’ representation via the
European Parliament and the Council) in practice as a source of legitimacy for
the EU.4
The contribution begins by depicting the EU institutional framework in
which the ECI was introduced, exploring the nature and theoretical potential
of the ECI as a force of legislative initiative (section 2). It expounds the
argument that, although the ECI does not have binding powers to oblige the
Commission to act, there could be more to the concept of the ECI than meets
the eye when it comes to its effect on EU lawmaking. On this premise, the
article then turns to examine the manifestation of the ECI’s follow-up stage in
practice so far (section 3).
In order to gauge the Commission’s discretion to respond to an ECI, the
article subsequently addresses two questions: first, whether and how the EU
co-legislators, namely the European Parliament and the Council, have affected
the chances of successful ECIs to lead to a legislative proposal (section 3.1).
Second, whether the Commission felt pressurized to act on the first wave of
successfully submitted ECIs in order to maintain the credibility of the ECI
mechanism (section 3.2). The analysis draws conclusions not only as to the
effectiveness of the ECI in influencing EU lawmaking, but also regarding the
institutional interactions that unfolded in the follow-up of the first few ECIs.
These findings point to a mismatch between, on the one hand, ECI
stakeholders’ expectations from the ECI, and, on the other hand, the capacity
of the ECI to produce legislative output (section 4). Based on these
considerations, we conclude by arguing that increasing the transparency of the
ECI’s follow-up stage is key to alleviating citizens’ frustration with the ECI
mechanism in the future by highlighting the positive effects of an ECI whilst
allowing the Commission to maintain its power of legislative initiative
(section 5).
4. For the argument that Arts. 11(4) and 10(2) TEU are complementary see Hrbek,
“National and European parties and the European Citizens’ Initiative”, 13 Perspectives on
European Politics and Society (2012), 370–384, at 372; Szeligowska and Mincheva, “The
European Citizens’ Initiative – empowering European citizens within the institutional triangle:
A political and legal analysis”, 13 Perspectives on European Politics and Society (2012),
270–284, at 271.
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2. The ECI as a force of legislative initiative?
Pre-Lisbon, citizens’ participation in EU agenda-setting was seen as taking
place indirectly, through arrangements for citizens’ representation by civil
society associations and interest groups. These institutional practices have
now largely been codified in Articles 11(1), (2), and (3) TEU. The
establishment of the ECI by the Treaty of Lisbon illustrates that the ECI is not
only a new opportunity for citizens’ participation in EU lawmaking, but also
a new element of the EU institutional and constitutional order. As such, the
ECI should be assessed vis-à-vis the broader EU institutional framework. The
starting point in this respect is that the ECI cannot generate legislation in its
own accord. As confirmed recently by the Court of Justice, “… it is for the
Commission alone to decide whether or not to submit a legislative proposal
and, as the case may be, to determine its subject matter, objective and
content”.5
In the context of both Article 11(4) TEU, and the ECI Regulation, the
non-binding character of the ECI mechanism is in line with the Commission’s
prerogative of legislative initiative, and the fundamental principle that the
Commission should not take instructions from other entities.6 Conferring on
the ECI a binding power would mean that the legal importance of the ECI
would have exceeded the parallel powers of the European Parliament and the
Council to promote legislation.7 Although the two co-legislators can request
the Commission to submit a legislative proposal by virtue of Articles 225
TFEU and 241 TFEU respectively, these proposals do not create any binding
obligations for the Commission.
Against this background, the introduction of the ECI in the EU institutional
framework begs the question: what can an ECI actually achieve in terms of
5. Case C-409/13, Council v. Commission (MFA), EU:C:2014:2470, para 74; Art. 17(2)
TEU.The Commission’s right of initiative is, generally speaking, undivided, the main exception
being the area of Justice and Home Affairs, where the Commission shares the right to propose
new legislative acts with a quarter of the Member States (Art. 76 TFEU). For other examples
showing that the Commission’s right of initiative is not entirely exclusive, see Art. 7 TEU and
Art. 129 TFEU, and Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Case C-409/13,MFA, EU:C:2014:2470, para
43; For a commentary on theMFA case see Ritleng, “Does the European Court of Justice take
democracy seriously?”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 11–23.
6. Art. 17(3) TEU; Dougan, op. cit. supra note 2 at 1842.
7. Ponzano, “A million citizens can request European Legislation: A sui generis right of
initiative”, <www. blogs.eui.eu/eudo-cafe/2011/04/13/a-million-citizens-can-request-europea
n-legislation-a-sui-generis-right-of-initiative/> (last visited 15 June 2016); Dougan, op. cit.
supra note 2 at 1842. Other academic commentators advocated a legal obligation for the
Commission to submit legislative proposals on the basis of an ECI. See e.g. Epiney,
“Europäische verfassung und legitimation durch die unionsbürger” in Kadelbach (Ed.),
Europäische Verfassung und Direkte Demokratie (Nomos, 2006), p. 49.
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influencing legislation at the EU level? According to the former Commission
vice-president, Maros Šefcovic, the ECI was supposed to be “a powerful
agenda-setting tool in the hands of citizens”.8 In the same vein, the ECI has
also been described as a mechanism that gives EU citizens the opportunity to
affect the EU political agenda by introducing collective claims to the EU
decision-making process.9 The question of the ECI’s potential to affect EU
legislation becomes all the more pertinent considering two recent judgments
of the General Court on the interpretation of the ECI Regulation.According to
the General Court, citizens have a right to submit proposed ECIs, and the
objective of the ECI mechanism is not to initiate “a mere dialogue between
the citizens and the institutions” but “to request the Commission, within the
framework of its powers, to submit a proposal for an act”.10
In examining the ECI’s potential as a force of legislative initiative, the
formally non-binding nature of the mechanism is only one factor. Another
factor concerns the EU institutional reality in which the ECI is being
developed in practice. This institutional reality, to which we now turn, should
serve as the basis to analyse the ECI’s capacity to influence EU legislation in
practice. As will be subsequently discussed, an anchoring point in such
analysis is that the Commission’s near-monopoly over legislative initiative is
not one-dimensional.11
2.1. The ECI and the multi-dimensional nature of the Commission’s power
of legislative initiative
The choice of proposing legislation, as well as the manner in which it does so,
belongs solely to the Commission. In the process of exercising its right of
legislative initiative, however, the Commission takes into account the
positions, views, and opinions of a multiplicity of actors such as interest
8. European Commission – Press Release, “Commission fires starting gun on European
Citizens’ Initiative”, 30 March 2012, IP/12/336.
9. Warleigh-Lack, “On the path to legitimacy? A critical deliberativist perspective on the
right to the citizens’ initiative” in Ruzza and Della Salla (Eds.), Governance and Civil Society
in the European Union: Normative Perspectives (Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 64.
10. Case T-44/14, Costantini and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2016:223, para 3; Case
T-450/12, Anagnostakis v. Commission, EU:T:2015:739, para 26. For a different take of what is
a successful ECI, exploring the multiple usages of the ECI beyond its agenda-setting potential,
see Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, “What is a successful ECI?” in Conrad, Knaut and Bottger,
op. cit. supra note 2 at pp. 149–165.
11. Princen, “Agenda-setting in the European Union: A theoretical exploration and agenda
for research”, 14 Journal of European Public Policy (2007), 21–38, at 21, 23 and 29; Nugent
and Rhinard, “Is the European Commission really in decline?”, 54 JCMS (2016), 1–17, at 6–8.
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groups, representatives of governments and industry, experts and trade
unions.12
The participation of interest groups in consultation procedures and other
lobbying activities ensures that an array of viewpoints and positions are
brought before the Commission. Consultation procedures are in fact promoted
by the Commission precisely because they bring to its attention the positions
of relevant stakeholders on a particular policy or legislation.13 Furthermore,
lobbying – broadly defined here as the attempts of various interest groups to
promote public and private interests before EU institutions and influence EU
policy – takes place at various stages of the EU lawmaking and policy process,
including policy formation and ratification of legislative acts.14
It is clear that there is a long history of cooperation between the
Commission and interest groups.15 According to the Commission, NGOs
represent the views of specific groups of citizens to the EU institutions.16 This
state of affairs between the Commission and interest groups can be perceived
as an exchange: the Commission obtains technical information, expertise, and
an insight into citizens’ views in exchange for giving lobbyists access to the
EU decision-making process.17 For the Commission, the value of NGOs’
12. Peeters et al., “The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: An
analysis of the tobacco industry’s attempts to ‘break the health silo’”, (2015) Tobacco Control,
6; Vogiatzis, “Is the European Citizens’ Initiative a serious threat for the Community method?”,
6 European Journal of Legal Studies (2013), 91–107. A detailed discussion of the role of
interest groups in EU decision-making falls outside the scope of this paper. The terms “interest
groups”, “organized civil society” and “lobbyists” will be used here interchangeably to connote
groups promoting both economic and general interests, as well as public interest groups such as
NGOs. Saurugger, “Interest groups and democracy in the European Union”, 31West European
Politics (2008), 1274–1291, at 1287; Lenaerts, “Institutional balance in the EU” in Joerges and
Dehousse (Eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 2002), p. 70.
13. House of Lords – EU Committee, Initiation of EU Legislation (HL 2007–2008, 150-I),
para 102; See also Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy
(OUP, 2013).
14. Hauser explains that “in the EU, businesses demand access to the Commission, the
Parliament and the Council with the ultimate objective of securing favourable legislation and
blocking adversative regulations. Citizens’ organizations, on the other hand, demand access
with ultimate collective goals such as the protection of public health and the environment”:
Hauser, “European Union lobbying post-Lisbon: An economic analysis”, 29 Berkeley Journal
of International Law (2011), 680–709, at 684 and 692.
15. Chalmers, “Direct democracy for the EU: A place for interest groups in the European
Citizens’ Initiative”, SWPWorking Paper (2011).
16. Commission Discussion Paper, “The Commission and non-governmental
organizations: Building a stronger partnership”, COM(2000)11 final.
17. Klüver, “Lobbying as a collective enterprise: Winners and losers of policy formulation
in the European Union”, 20 Journal of European Public Policy (2013), 59–76, at 62; Hauser, op.
cit. supra note 14 at 692.
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contribution to policy-shaping is mostly seen in the stage of initiating
legislation; consulting with these stakeholders before proposing legislation is
considered to improve policy design.18
From an institutional point of view, the European Council is also a key
source of influence upon the exercise of the Commission’s legislative
initiative, by setting out the EU’s priorities and general political direction.
Commission legislative proposals often originate from Member States’
preferences expressed collectively in the European Council, and it is common
for the European Council to issue directions to the Commission on submitting
such proposals.19 In the context of the Eurozone crisis specifically, the
European Council was even criticized for assuming the role of legislative
initiator by establishing detailed proposals masked as generic guidelines, and
monitoring their implementation.20
In light of this background, it can be seen that agenda-setting in most EU
policy areas involves the input of several actors with potentially conflicting
interests.21 Hence, although the ECI could not have been given any binding
powers to oblige the Commission to act, the potential of this participatory
mechanism to influence EU lawmaking could be greater than is first apparent.
This argument is reinforced by two observations concerning the rights of the
European Parliament and the Council to propose legislation to the
Commission (Arts. 225 and 241 TFEU respectively). Firstly, these two EU
institutions may seek to influence the Commission’s decisions on the
follow-up of the ECI either by way of their Treaty rights or less formal
mechanisms.22 For instance, the day-to-day informal interaction between EU
institutions and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) is a common
way to inform the Commission of any requests for legislation.23 The
Directives on the ban on tobacco advertising and on trans-frontier television
18. Saurugger, op. cit. supra note 12 at 1281; see Commission White Paper on Governance,
COM(2001)428 final, at 14, where it was stated that “[NGOs] play an important role at global
level in development policy [and they] often act as an early warning system for the direction of
political debate”.
19. Nugent and Rhinard, op. cit. supra note 11 at 5, 8, and 10.
20. Dawson and De Witte, “Constitutional balance in the EU after the Euro-crisis”, 76 MLR
(2013), 817–844, at 830. For a different view on the actual effect of the European Council on the
Commission’s right of initiative see Nugent and Rhinard, op. cit. supra note 11.
21. Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, op. cit. supra note 2 at 155.
22. Written evidence by Richard Corbett for the House of Lords EU Committee, Initiation
of EU Legislation (HL 2007–2008, 150-I).
23. House of Lords, ibid., para 84.
European Citizens’ Initiative 183
broadcasts are examples of legislation that originated from calls for action by
the European Parliament.24
The influence of the two EU institutions, the argument goes, directly affects
the potential of the ECI to turn citizens’ proposal into legislation. Particularly
at the beginning of the ECI’s operation, an expectation was expressed in the
literature that, if the European Parliament and the Council support a
successfully submitted ECI, the proposal put forward could have more
chances of being followed up by the Commission as a legislative proposal.25
On this view, the two co-legislators could promote an ECI by putting pressure
on the Commission to respond positively to the Initiative’s proposals. This
would be all the more likely considering that, at the end of a successful
campaign, ECI organizers are invited to a public hearing with participants
from the EU institutions (Art. 11 ECI Regulation).
Secondly, the indirect legislative proposals of the European Parliament and
the Council are increasingly being followed up by the Commission.26 The
Recital to the ECI Regulation confirms that the indirect right of legislative
initiative of one million people has a similar status to the right held by the
European Parliament and the Council. An outright rejection of an ECI by the
EU institutions (particularly the Commission) would not only have negative
effects on the ECI’s credibility as an agenda-setting mechanism.27 It would
also be significant with regard to the future use of the ECI, since “participation
without power can lead to more disaffection, as citizens go through the
exercise of engaging only to have decisions taken elsewhere and for reasons
unrelated to citizen input”.28 It has therefore been suggested that, in the same
way that the Commission is hesitant to ignore the non-binding proposals of
24. See respectively Directive 98/43/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of
tobacco products, O.J. 1998, L 213; Directive 97/36/EC amending Council Directive
89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting
activities, O.J. 1997, L 202/60; Corbett in House of Lords EU Committee report supra note 22.
25. Smith, “The European Citizens’ Initiative: A new institution for empowering Europe’s
citizens?” in Dougan, Shuibhne and Spaventa (Eds.), Empowerment and Disempowerment of
the European Citizen (Hart, 2012), pp. 277–290, at 285; Maiani, “Citizen participation and the
LisbonTreaty:A legal perspective”, (2011) Studies in Public Policy, 118; Dougan, op. cit. supra
note 2 at 1843–1844.
26. Ponzano, Hermanin and Corona, “The power of initiative of the European Commission:
A progressive erosion?” 89 Notre Europe Study and Research (2012), 39 and 40.
27. Vogiatzis, op. cit. supra note 12 at 107.
28. Warren, “Citizen participation and democratic deficits: Considerations from the
perspective of democratic theory” in De Bardeleben and Pammett, (Eds.), Activating the
Citizen (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 29; Dougan, op. cit. supra note 2 at 1844; Bouza Garcia,
“How could the new Article 11 TEU contribute to reduce the EU’s democratic malaise?” in
Dougan, Nic Shuibhne and Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 25, p. 273.
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the co-legislators, it would be hesitant to turn down a successfully submitted
ECI which expresses the views of a representative part of the EU citizenry.29
All things considered, the Commission’s responsiveness to guidelines of
the European Council, and proposals from the European Parliament and
Council, as well as its exchanges with multiple actors, indicate that the
non-binding nature of the ECI should not necessarily mean that successfully
submitted ECIs would not have any influence on the Commission’s monopoly
of initiative. Four years after the registration of the first ECI, and considering
that three Initiatives have managed to collect a million signatures and proceed
to the follow-up stage, the time is ripe to assess the potential of citizens to
influence EU legislation by organizing an ECI.
3. The ECI on the ground
Inevitably, the exploration of the ECI’s actual potential to affect EU
lawmaking will revolve around the Commission’s discretion to act on a
successfully submitted ECI.This section engages with this task by focusing on
the stage that comes after the 12-month deadline for the collection of
signatures, namely the “follow-up” or “examination” stage for successfully
submitted ECIs. This stage includes a public hearing at the European
Parliament and an official response from the Commission to the ECI’s
organizers.
The legal framework in place does not allow ECI organizers to do much to
influence the Commission’s discretion concerning the final outcome of their
Initiative. After the validation of signatures is completed, the organizers can
submit their ECI to the Commission (Art. 9 ECI Regulation). If they have
managed to collect the necessary signatures, they proceed to the public
hearing procedure. The ECI Regulation requires that a public hearing must be
organized for the ECI organizers at the premises of the European Parliament
and should be attended by representatives of the Commission (Art. 11 ECI
Regulation). Between the submission of an ECI and the date of the public
hearing, Commission representatives must meet with the ECI organizers to
hear the details of their proposed initiatives (Art. 10(1)(b) ECI Regulation).
After the public hearing, the Commission has three months to publish a
Communication with its legal and political conclusions on the ECI, “the action
it intends to take, if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking that action”
(Art. 10(1)(c) ECI Regulation).
29. Ponzano, op. cit. supra note 7; Bouza Garcia, Participatory Democracy and Civil
Society in the EU (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 137.
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In the first four years of the ECI’s operation, three of the 34 registered ECIs
managed to collect the minimum number of signatures required: “One of Us”
collected 1,897,588 signatures; “Right to Water” 1,844,790; and “Stop
Vivisection” 1,326,807 signatures. Of the remaining ECIs that reported the
number of signatures that they collected, none was even close to the one
million threshold.30
The three ECIs with the most signatures presented their initiatives to
Commission representatives and MEPs at public hearings in the European
Parliament. Members of different Commission Directorate Generals (DGs)
attended the public hearings, depending on the topic of each ECI.
Subsequently, the Commission responded to the ECI organizers with
Communications. In each of the three Communications, the Commission set
out its conclusions as to any follow-up actions that it would take based on the
ECI; notably, it did not commit to any binding legislative acts based on the
submitted proposals.
There is a noticeable contrast between the three Communications of the
Commission to the successful ECIs. While the Commission proposed some
follow-up actions for the “Right to Water” and the “Stop Vivisection” ECIs, it
rejected all of the proposals of “One of Us” without even suggesting any
alternatives or compromises. To some extent, the differences in the
Commission’s responses can be attributed to the substantial divergence in the
subject matters of these ECIs, and to the antithesis of their overall objectives.
The ECIs related to issues of water privatization, animal experimentation, and
abortion (phrased in the ECI proposal as “destruction of human embryos”)
respectively; and while “Right to Water” mainly asked the Commission to take
further action in areas in which the EU was already acting, “One of Us” and
“Stop Vivisection” asked the Commission to make radical policy changes. Of
the three, the “Right to Water” ECI, which was the first to be submitted and the
least controversial, received the most affirmative response from the
Commission.
Against this background, we now consider the Commission’s discretion to
act on a successfully submitted ECI by addressing two questions formulated in
light of the argument that the ECI could have more influence on the
Commission’s power of initiative than its legal framework reveals. The first
question asks whether and how the two EU co-legislators have affected the
chances of successful ECIs leading to a Commission’s proposal. The second
30. The reader can refer to the ECI website for information and data regarding the ECIs
mentioned throughout this contribution: <www.ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/publi
c/welcome> (last visited 10 June 2016). The Commission’s 3-year Report on the ECI provides
further information: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the application of Regulation (EU) No. 211/2011 on the citizens’ initiative, COM(2015)145
final.
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question asks whether the Commission was under pressure to act on the first
wave of successfully submitted ECIs in order to maintain the credibility of the
mechanism.
3.1. Did the European Parliament and the Council affect the chances of
ECIs leading to legislation?
Of the three ECIs, the outcome of the “Right to Water”, which was the first
ECI that managed to collect the necessary signatures, had the most positive
results. Having reached the signature thresholds in 15 Member States, the ECI
was submitted to the Commission on 20 December 2013. Its public hearing
was organized by the European Parliament Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI Committee), and was attended by
MEPs, the ECI’s citizens’ committee, and a large number of activists and
members of the public.
In brief, the submitted ECI proposal comprised three requests. It primarily
asked for the adoption of EU legislation that recognizes water and sanitation
as a human right in line with international law under the 2010 United Nations
Resolution 64/292.31 It also suggested that the provision of water and
sanitation should be acknowledged as a public service for all EU citizens
under Article 14 TFEU, which would mean that the Commission should
abstain from proposing legislative initiatives for the liberalization of water and
sanitation services. Finally, the ECI urged the Commission to increase its
efforts to achieve universal access to water and sanitation as part of the EU’s
development policy (Arts. 209 and 210 TFEU). The bottom line is that the ECI
aimed to prevent the privatization of water services in the EU. The common
rationale behind the three requests was that making the provision of water
services a public good is the only way to establish the human right to water,
and since the privatization of water supply would conflict with this right, such
privatization should be prohibited.32
The Commission released its official response to the “Right to Water” on 19
March 2014, in a Communication accompanied by a Press Release with an
eye-catching title (“Commission says yes to first successful European
Citizens’ Initiative”),33 implying that the Commission decided to act on the
31. United Nations Resolution 64/292 adopted by the General Assembly on 28 July 2010,
A/RES/64/292.
32. Schiffler,Water, Politics andMoney:A Reality Check on Privatization (Springer, 2015),
p. 116.
33. Commission Communication on the European Citizens’ Initiative, “Water and
sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!”, COM(2014)177 final,
Brussels, 19 Mar. 2014; European Commission – Press Release, “Commission says yes to first
successful European Citizens’ Initiative”, 19 Mar. 2014, IP/14/277.
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ECI’s proposals. Ensuring that the EU remains neutral regarding national
decisions for water undertakings and prioritizing attempts for universal access
to water and sanitation in the context of the EU’s development policy, were
identified as some of the areas in which the Commission was prepared to act.
With respect to these areas, the Communication outlined a series of follow-up
actions in response to “Right to Water”.
Although the Press Release stated that “the Commission today decided to
react positively to the first ever successful ECI”, it is more accurate to say that
the Commission met the requests of the organizers somewhat halfway. For
instance, even though the Commission acknowledged the human rights
dimension of access to safe drinking water and sanitation, it did not suggest
relevant legislation to make this a part of EU law under Article 14 TFEU as the
ECI organizers had suggested. Furthermore, most of the actions proposed by
the Commission built upon already existing EU efforts, thus making it unclear
whether they were indeed measures tailored to the ECI or merely a
continuation of the Commission’s current practice.34 As for the central
objective of the ECI – to prevent the privatization of water services – the
Commission only mentioned the exclusion of water from the Concessions
Directive and from legislation on public procurement where local authorities
decide to provide the water services themselves.35
Despite the lack of a proposal for a legally binding instrument, the
Commission has pursued some of its proposed follow-up actions since its
reply to the “Right to Water” organizers.36 For example, it invited the ECI
organizers to participate in a stakeholder meeting on the benchmarking of
water quality. Most notably, the Commission has committed to revise the
Drinking Water Directive.37 In this respect, the Commission’s Work
Programme 2017 refers explicitly to the “Right to Water” ECI as one of the
driving forces behind the revision, the other being the recent evaluation of the
Directive as part of the Commission’s “Regulatory Fitness and Performance
Programme” (REFIT).38
34. For example, the Commission stated that it would build on the commitments presented
in the 7th Environmental Action programme in order to reinforce implementation of water
quality legislation: COM(2014)177 final, 13.
35. Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 Feb. 2014 on
the award of concession contracts, O.J. 2014, L 94/1, Art. 12.
36. A summary of the actions is available at: <www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_ge
neral/followup_actions/citizens_initiative_en.htm> (last visited 10 June 2016).
37. Council Directive 98/83/EC of 3 Nov. 1998 on the quality of water intended for human
consumption, O.J. 1998, L 330.
38. European Commission Work Programme 2017, COM(2016)710 final, 5 <www.ec.eu
ropa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2017_en.pdf>.
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Not only was some action taken by the Commission as a response, but
formal support was also received from the European Parliament. Specifically,
an own-initiative resolution on the follow-up to the “Right to Water” was
prepared by the ENVI Committee, with Opinions from the Petitions
Committee (PETI) and the Committee on Development (DEVE),39 and
adopted by the European Parliament Plenary on 8 September 2015
(hereinafter: European Parliament Resolution).40
The starting point of the European Parliament Resolution was that the
Commission’s reply to the “Right to Water” was unsatisfactory because it did
not introduce all the measures that were necessary to achieve the objectives of
the ECI. On this premise, and motivated by two considerations, the European
Parliament requested that the Commission takes further actions. The first
consideration behind the Resolution relates to the topic of the particular ECI.
The European Parliament shares the view and aspirations of the ECI
organizers that water should be recognized as a human right at the EU level.To
this end, the Resolution asked the Commission to submit legislative proposals
and consider revising the Water Framework Directive.41 The second
motivation underlying the Resolution is more broadly linked to the
functioning of the ECI as a mechanism for participatory democracy. In this
regard, the European Parliament maintains the view that the credibility of the
ECI is at risk unless the Commission comes up with relevant legislative
proposals.
At first sight, the position of the European Parliament on the follow-up of
“Right to Water” seems to support the argument that an ECI that has not been
acted upon by the Commission could still have a chance of resulting in
legislation if it is supported by the European Parliament or the Council.42 The
adoption of the European Parliament Resolution in plenary confirms that EU
institutions could promote an ECI by putting pressure on the Commission to
respond positively to the proposals of the organizers.
The argument, however, becomes more nuanced when one looks at the
Commission’s response to the European Parliament’s Resolution.43 The
response emphasized that “under the existing requirements the Commission is
not obliged to follow all the specific requests contained in a successful ECI”
39. European Parliament Report on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative
Right2Water (2014/2239(INI)) A8-0228/2015, 14 July 2015 (hereinafter EP Report on “Right
to Water”).
40. European Parliament resolution of 8 Sept. 2015 on the follow-up to the European
Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water (2014/2239(INI)), P8_TA-PROV(2015).
41. Ibid., para 10.
42. See supra section 2.1.
43. European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament resolution on the follow
up to the ECI Right2Water, 9 Dec. 2015, <www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/fichepro
cedure.do?lang=en&reference=2014/2239(INI)#tab-0%3C> (last visited 19 Dec. 2016).
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and that “when the Commission does not respond positively to each element
of a successful ECI, this cannot be considered to be neglecting the initiative”.
Having said that, it noted that the Commission “will consider all of
Parliament’s calls related to water and environmental policies and take them
into account in its future work”.
Admittedly, it is still uncertain whether the European Parliament
Resolution will have any tangible effect on the Commission’s future follow-up
actions to the “Right to Water”. Advocates of representative democracy are
likely to criticize the Commission for not following the European
Parliament’s suggestions more closely. Almost irrespective of its actual
influence, however, the Parliament’s involvement in the continuation of the
ECI in question sheds light on the interaction between participatory (Art.
11(4) TEU) and representative (Art. 10(2) TEU) avenues of citizens’
engagement in EU politics. In particular, the Parliament’s political influence
(representative avenue) in promoting an ECI (participatory avenue) has a dual
benefit. First, the said ECI could still potentially benefit from an increased
chance to result in tangible actions from the Commission. Moreover, if the
organizers decide to continue campaigning after the end of the ECI’s lifecycle,
their campaign will benefit from the Parliament’s support irrespective of
whether or not the Commission acts upon the initiative. The “Right to Water”
organizers, for instance, are now able to claim not only that they have a
mandate from their 1.9 million signatories to continue pushing for their
objectives, but also that their attempts are reinforced by the only directly
elected democratic institution of the EU. The Parliament’s support for the
ECI’s cause can only help with the visibility of the campaign. Secondly, by
promoting a successfully submitted ECI such as the “Right to Water” for
inclusion in the Commission’s legislative agenda, the Parliament enhances its
own image as a representative of EU citizens. By supporting the successful
ECI, the Parliament promotes an image of itself as the defender of
successfully submitted ECIs and as an institution that is ready to step up in
support of EU citizens’ attempts to voice their collective aspirations.44 In
addition, the Parliament’s Resolution has provided another layer of
accountability from the Commission, by forcing the latter to publish a reply to
the Resolution further explaining the reasons behind its response to the said
ECI.
44. This is not the first time the EP has explicitly asserted such a role. Its willingness to
make use of its powers and political influence for the purposes of protecting citizens’ interests
was also evidenced in its rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). As a
formal agreement with a third country, ACTA needed the consent of the EP (Art. 218 TFEU) in
order to be concluded. In July 2012, ACTA was rejected by 478 to 39 votes due to concerns
about the inadequate protection of citizens’ intellectual rights and data privacy.
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Whatever the outcome of the institutional crossing between the Parliament
and the Commission, the case of “Right to Water” illustrates the synergy
between citizens’ representative avenues and citizens’ participatory avenues
in the context of the EU institutional order with respect to the ECI.45 This
synergy demonstrates that the ECI is not detached from the rest of the EU’s
legal and institutional fabric and should be seen as an opportunity for citizens’
participation that exists in parallel to the functioning of the Parliament as the
main representative body for EU citizens. It can thus be argued that Article
10(2) TEU and Article 11(4) TEU reinforce each other both in theory and in
practice, as opportunities for EU citizens to become involved in the EU
decision-making process.
By way of contrast with the European Parliament’s vocal presence in the
follow-up to the “Right to Water”, the Council has been absent from the ECI’s
examination stage. No Council representatives attended the three ECIs’ public
hearings, and no official position on any of the ECIs has been published by the
Council. At the start of the ECI, academic commentators argued that the
Council could filter an ECI as part of the ordinary legislative process thus
affecting the ECI’s final outcome.46 As will be shown below, the response of
the Commission to “One of Us” further suggests that the positions, priorities,
and activities both of the Council and the European Parliament also have an
indirect impact on the Commission’s reaction to successfully submitted ECIs.
After collecting the largest number of validated signatures collected by an
ECI to date (1,897,588), “One of Us” was presented to the European
Parliament at a public hearing on 10 April 2014. “One of Us” asked for an
EU-wide ban and termination of “the financing of activities which presuppose
the destruction of human embryos”, such as EU funds for research and foreign
aid programmes linked in some way to human embryos and especially
abortion. The ECI’s proposals consisted of three legislative amendments to
existing EU secondary legislation. According to the proposals: the Financial
Regulation47 should stop any budget allocation for the funding of activities
that require the destruction of human embryos; these activities should be
45. At the early stages of the ECI’s operation, Dougan wrote in this Review about the
possibility of the EP and the Council to call upon the Commission to act “thus combining the
pressure of participatory with that of representative democracy upon the exercise of the
Commission’s prerogative of legislative initiative”: see Dougan, op. cit. supra note 2 at 1844.
46. Lopez, “A Preliminary approach to the regulation on European Citizens’ Initiative from
comparative constitutional law”, Bruges Political Research Papers No 24 (2012), 256.
47. Regulation (EU, Euratom) 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 Oct. 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002, O.J. 2012, L 298/1; Commission Delegated
Regulation 1268/2012 of 29 Oct. 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom)
966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the
general budget of the Union, O.J. 2012, L 362/1.
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excluded from the scope of financing of research projects under Horizon
2020;48 and, the EU Development Cooperation policy49 should be modified to
prohibit the allocation of EU funds to organizations that directly or indirectly
promote abortion in third countries.
During the public hearing of the ECI, which was organized jointly by the
Committee on Development, the Committee on Legal Affairs, the Committee
on Industry, Research and Energy, and the PETI Committee, an intense debate
took place between MEPs and the ECI organizers. The ECI organizers blamed
the EU for financing abortion through development aid, even in countries
where abortion is illegal, and asked for transparency in the Commission’s
funding practices. Although some MEPs supported the ECI, others criticized
it on the basis that it would prohibit the EU from meeting its international
commitments on development aid, family planning, and sexual and
reproductive health.50 These concerns were later reflected in the
Commission’s Communication, which was published on 28 May 2014.51
Every single proposal of the ECI was rejected by the Commission in its
Communication. The main reason put forward by the Commission for
refusing to act in response to “One of Us” was that the two EU co-legislators
had only recently voted for the current legislation. This justification strongly
suggests that the views of the EU co-legislators are vital in the Commission’s
decision to go through with the drafting of legislation and, by extension, with
accepting or rejecting an ECI.52 After all, the process of determining the issues
to be included in the EU agenda is just as political in nature as the process of
48. This exclusion would primarily affect research activities that require the collection or
use of human embryonic stem cells: Regulation (EU) 1291/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 11 Dec. 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 – the Framework Programme for
Research and Innovation (2014–2020) and repealing Decision 1982/2006/EC, O.J. 2013, L
347/104.
49. Regulation 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 Mar. 2014
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014–2020,
O.J. 2014, L 77/44.
50. Author’s observations from the public hearing. For two very different descriptions of
the hearing see: International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), “European Citizens’
Initiative ‘One Of Us’ discussed in European Parliament”, <www.ippfen.org/news/>, and
European Dignity Watch, “Historic hearing at European Parliament”, <www.europeandi
gnitywatch.org/pl/codzienny/detail/article/historic-hearing-at-european-parliament.html>
(both visited 8 June 2016).
51. Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative “One of Us”
of 28 May 2014, COM(2014)355 final.
52. See Vogiatzis op. cit. supra note 12 for a similar argument made at the initial stages of
the ECI; see generally on the Commission’s legislative initiative Rasmussen, “Challenging the
Commission’s right of initiative? Conditions for institutional change and stability”, 30 West
European Politics (2007), 248–249; Nugent and Rhinard, op. cit. supra note 11.
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deciding on those issues once they are on the agenda.53 It is not uncommon for
the Commission to abstain from submitting proposals that are likely to be
rejected by the two institutions. Take here as an example the Commission’s
2015 Programme, which worked on the basis of “political discontinuity”,
according to which a newly-structured Commission can review all the existing
legislative proposals at the beginning of its term and decide which of those
proposals to pursue and which to withdraw.54 After what the Commission
described as “constructive discussions with the other institutions”, only
legislative proposals with good chances of being adopted remained on the
table.55
The description of the European Parliament’s and the Council’s indirect
influence over the Commission’s prerogative of legislative initiative tallies
well with the Commission’s reply to “One of Us”. It appears from the
Commission’s Communication that, knowing that the European Parliament
and the Council would not have voted for a proposal to modify the
heavily-debated regulatory framework that they had adopted only a few
months previously, the Commission chose not to proceed with undertaking
any legislative or other commitments based on the proposals of “One of Us”.56
This is not to say that the Commission’s decision was or will always be
directed by the two legislative institutions; the Commission has its own agenda
as well, which does not always follow the agendas of the European Parliament
or the Council.57 It is rather suggested that, based on the currently available
evidence, an ECI has slim chances of resulting in a legislative proposal if its
aims and objectives sharply contrast with the priorities and existing agenda of
the Commission or the two co-legislators.58
Although the ECI was launched and promoted as an indirect way to propose
legislation analogous to the rights of the European Parliament (Art. 225
TFEU) and the Council (Art. 241 TFEU), the difference is apparent.
53. Princen op. cit. supra note 11 at 22.
54. FrameworkAgreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European
Commission, O.J. 2010, L 304/47, point 39(2); Commission Communication, “Commission
Work Programme 2015: A New Start”, COM(2014)910 final.
55. Over the past five years, on average 30 proposals were withdrawn annually. European
Commission – Press Release, “Commission confirms withdrawal of 73 pending proposals
announced in 2015 work programme”, 7 Mar. 2015, IP/15/4567; European Commission – Fact
Sheet, “Questions and Answers: The 2015 Work Programme”, 16 Dec. 2014, MEMO/14/2704.
56. Smismans, “Democratic participation and the search for an institutional architecture
that accommodates interests and expertise” in Piattoni (Ed.), The European Union:
Institutional Architectures and Democratic Principles in Times of Crisis (OUP, 2015), p. 92.
57. Princen, op. cit. supra note 11 at 28; an example is the recent inter-institutional dispute
on the Commission’s power to withdraw a legislative proposal, see Case C-409/13,MFA.
58. Bouza Garcia and Greenwood explain that “interest groups are more effective when
advocating agendas that go in the direction of a change that is desirable to one of the
institutions”: see op. cit. supra note 2 at 155.
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Essentially, the comparison is between the weight of the influence exerted on
the agenda by the two EU co-legislators and the influence of a group of less
than 2 million citizens. Even though the required one million signatories of a
successful ECI are supposed to represent the EU as a whole, they amount to
little more than 0.2 percent of the entire EU citizenry, and the proposals are not
the subject of any popular voting.59 The Commission’s response to “One of
Us” strongly indicates that, so far, between the preferences of the
Commission, European Parliament and Council, and those of one million ECI
signatories, the former prevail in the Commission’s considerations about its
reply to a successfully submitted ECI.
The follow-up of “One of Us” therefore reveals a different picture than that
of “Right to Water” regarding the interplay of citizens’ representation and
citizens’ participation in the EU. In the context of the second successfully
submitted ECI, the two forms of citizens’ civic engagement do not co-exist in
synergy, but are rather juxtaposed in the EU decision-making apparatus. So
far, the inter-institutional dynamics appear to favour the position of the two
co-legislators where these are opposed to the objectives of a successfully
submitted ECI. This observation could even indicate that the more elaborate
the legislation in a specific field (for instance, in areas that are heavily
regulated such as research funding and development aid), the more difficult it
would be for an ECI to trigger a legislative change in that area.60
3.2. Was the Commission under pressure to act on the first wave of ECIs?
The Commission’s willingness to act on the “Right to Water” close to the end
of the signature collection stage with regard to the Concessions Directive
supports the argument that the Commission would be hesitant to disregard a
successful ECI proposal. The organizers of “Right to Water” were explicitly
against the adoption of the Directive, which they perceived at the time as the
latest indirect attempt of the EU to privatize water services.61 In June 2013, the
then Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Michael Barnier,
announced that water was removed from the scope of the Concessions
Directive. Barnier explicitly referred to the “Right to Water” ECI in his
statement, commenting that it is the Commission’s duty “to take into account
59. Smismans, op. cit. supra note 56 at 92.
60. Ibid.
61. “How the concessions directive is a new piece in a longer struggle to privatise water and
make money out of water-services”, 20 Feb. 2013 <www.right2water.eu/news/how-conces
sions-directive-new-piece-longer-struggle-privatise-water-and-make-money-out-water> (last
visited 10 June 2016).
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the concerns expressed by so many citizens”.62 Nonetheless, the pressure from
such concerned voices worked to the benefit of the ECI organizers only to a
certain extent. While the organizers welcomed the exclusion of water from the
Directive and from public procurement legislation, they criticized the
Commission for not also excluding water services from international
negotiations, such as the negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP).63
In addition, the response to the “One of Us” proposals refutes any strong
expectations that the Commission would feel pressurized to act upon a
successfully submitted ECI as an attempt to safeguard the popularity and
credibility of this novel mechanism. The Press Officer of “One of Us” had
expressed the view that it was unlikely that the Commission would ignore the
nearly two million signatures collected by the campaign.64 Despite the
expectations of the organizers, the Commission has made full use of its
discretion to decide on the future of the ECI based on political considerations.
The outcome of “One of Us” throws into sharp relief the inability of the ECI
to exert strong pressure on the Commission in order to compel it to take action.
In this respect, it is also relevant that the prime responsibility to respond to an
ECI belongs to the Commission rather than an elected, representative
institution. Research about national experiences of citizens’ initiatives
indicates that the attitude of representative bodies to successful citizens’
initiatives can have direct impact on the chance of re-election of national
parties.65 As the Commission is not elected by voters, it does not risk losing
voters’ support as a result of its decisions, and thus has a weaker incentive to
act on ECI proposals.66
The follow-up of “One of Us” is a telling example not only of the
interinstitutional dynamics that surround the operation of the ECI, but also of
the array of factors to be taken into account when deciding on the proposals of
an ECI. Apart from the above-mentioned democratic considerations
62. Statement by Commissioner Michel Barnier, 21 June 2013, <ec.europa.eu/archives/
commission_2010–2014/barnier/headlines/speeches/2013/06/20130621_en.html> (last visit
ed 9 June 2016).
63. Press Release from the “Right2Water” Citizens’ Committee, “Commission lacks
ambition in replying to first European Citizens’ Initiative”, <www.right2water.eu/news/press
-release-commission-lacks-ambition-replying-first-european-citizens%E2%80%99-initiative>
(last visited 2 June 2016).
64. Ana Del Pino, Interview in Berg and Thomson (Eds.), An ECI That Works! (ECI
Campaign, 2014).
65. Qvortrup, “The legislative initiative: A comparative analysis of the domestic
experiences in EU countries” in Dougan, Nic Shuibhne and Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 25, p.
298; Muller, “Party competition and plebiscitary politics in Austria”, 17 Electoral Studies
(1998), 21–43, at 21, 26 and 31.
66. Smith, op. cit. supra note 25, p. 285.
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seemingly taken into account by the Commission, the Communication also
explained that the current state of play in the EU with regard to the policy areas
in question was satisfactory. The strict monitoring, evaluation, and financial
audits which take place to ensure the quality of these financing programmes
was emphasized throughout the Communication. According to the
Commission, there is no need to propose changes to the current legislation.67
A similar focus on current legislative efficiency is observed with respect to
the Commission’s follow-up to “Stop Vivisection”. The ECI proposed the
repeal of Directive 2001/63/EU68 in order to phase out the practice of animal
experimentation. The third successfully submitted ECI serves as an example
of additional considerations that limit the potential of an ECI to have an impact
on the Commission’s power of legislative initiative. In its Communication, the
Commission highlighted the twofold effectiveness of the Directive in allowing
the use of animal models to test medicines that could be too dangerous for
human trials and in ensuring the protection of such animals.69 The main
message of the Communication was that, although the Commission shared the
position of the ECI organizers on abolishing animal experimentation in the
future, the Directive is currently “an indispensable tool at the EU level”.
Contrary to the categorical rejection of “One of Us”, some follow-up
actions were proposed by the Commission in response to “Stop Vivisection”,
including actions to accelerate the phasing out of animal-based research, and
the organization of a debate between the scientific community and relevant
stakeholders, including the ECI organizers, on developing alternative
methods of experimentation. Most of these actions, however, were either
based on existing activities of the Commission or would have taken place
anyway in the context of Directive 2010/63/EC.70 Moreover, according to the
Commission, the Directive is currently the most efficient way to ensure the
welfare of animals used in experiments. Animal experimentation has led to
numerous advancements in medicine and rejecting it altogether was a
premature objective that would only result in the deregulation of animal
practices and thus in an inadequate standard of animal protection. The
efficiency of the current legislative framework for the protection of those
animals meant that the objectives of the ECI could not be met at this point in
time.
67. Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative “One of Us”
of 28 May 2014, COM(2014)355 final, 16.
68. Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Sept. 2010
on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes, O.J. 2010, L 276/33.
69. Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative “Stop
Vivisection” of 3 June 2015, COM(2015)3773 final, 10.
70. Ibid., 8–9, Actions 1, 2 and 3.
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To summarize, it would appear that the effectiveness and efficiency of
current legislation are primary considerations for the Commission when
deciding on how to reply to an ECI. In this respect, the outcome of “Stop
Vivisection” can also be linked with the so-called trade-off between input and
output legitimacy, whereby “good output policies are seen to make up for a
lack of participatory input”.71 In a similar vein, it can be argued that the
importance placed on the efficiency of current legislation (output legitimacy)
is aimed at compensating organizers for the partial disregard of the concrete
proposals of “Stop Vivisection” (input legitimacy).
Unless one subscribes to the argument that the Commission should be
obliged to initiate the legislative process for each successfully submitted ECI,
it should be accepted that the Commission’s role is to assess each successful
ECI by considering several factors, such as the effectiveness of the general
legal framework, the view and agendas of the EU co-legislators, and the
legislative and political priorities of the EU. This approach can be discerned in
the responses to the first three successfully submitted ECIs. Our analysis has
demonstrated that, so far, the ECI has been an instrument with weak potential
to affect the near-monopoly of the Commission to initiate legislation to any
substantial degree. This conclusion necessitates an inquiry into the effect of
the outcome of the three Initiatives on the credibility of the ECI as a citizens’
participatory mechanism.
4. Mapping expectations and outcomes regarding the ECI’s follow-up
stage
The preceding discussion illustrated how the Commission’s discretion to act
on successfully submitted ECIs has been manifested.This discretion has so far
had rather negative consequences for the credibility and future development of
the ECI. For instance, the organizers of “One of Us” stated that the
Commission’s reply was “hypocritical and disdainful as the Commission
pretends to not understand the purpose of the [ECI’s] demand and comprises
of thirty pages of self-satisfaction of its own policy”.72 In a similar manner, the
organizers of “Stop Vivisection” commented: “We feel that 1.2 million
citizens and three years of intense campaigning deserve something better than
71. Schmidt, “Democracy and legitimacy in the European Union revisited: Input, output
and ‘throughput’”, 61 Political Studies (2013), 2 and 8.
72. “The Commission Vetoes the Citizens’ Initiative ‘One of Us’”, 28 May 2014,
<www.oneofus.eu/the-commission-vetos-the-citizens-initiative-one-of-us/> (last visited 2
June 2016).
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a very superficial, generic reply.”73 Even the “Right to Water” organizers, who
received a more positive response, stated with regard to the absence of a
commitment to a legislative proposal that “the reaction of the European
Commission lacks any real ambition to respond appropriately to the
expectations of 1.9 million people”.74 The organizers also commented: “If the
European Commission doesn’t want to satisfy our demands, it should just say
it and provide reasons instead of pretending to do one thing and do the
opposite.”75
The statements by the organizers indicate dissatisfaction not only with the
outcome of their ECIs, but also with the process by which the Commission
reached and communicated its replies. The organizers’ reactions were neither
unforeseen nor surprising. In the context of participatory mechanisms which
grant the final say to representative institutions rather than citizens, actors who
use these mechanisms may be left disappointed with the outcome if they
perceive that their attempts were not at all influential.76 It also appears from
the ECI organizers’ comments that they had certain expectations from the EU
institutions, which were left unfulfilled. Although the Commission clarified
from the beginning that the ECI is not a legally binding mechanism, the
demanding nature of the ECI – with the detailed legal framework and all the
procedural hurdles of the signature collection process77 – seems to have
triggered expectations among the organizers that they would receive
something other than a mere Communication from the Commission at the end
of their campaign. This sentiment is encapsulated in the currently pending
case of One of Us v. Commission78 where the organizers of “One of Us” are
73. Stop Vivisection Press Release, “A disappointing response”, (5 June 2015) <www.stop
vivisection.eu/en/content/press-releases> (last visited 2 June 2016).
74. Press Release from the “Right 2 Water” Citizens’ Committee, 19 Mar. 2014,
<www.right2water.eu/news/press-release-commission-lacks-ambition-replying-first-european
-citizens%E2%80%99-initiative> (last visited 2 June 2016).
75. Feedback from “Corporate Europe Observatory” to Ombudsman’s own-initiative
inquiry OI/9/2013/TN into the functioning of the ECI procedure, <www.ombudsman.e
uropa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/54510/html> (last visited 2 June 2016).
76. Carman, “The process is the reality: Perceptions of procedural fairness and
participatory democracy”, 58 Political Studies (2010), 731–751, at 731 and 736; Marriott, “A
‘meaningless charade’? Public petitioning and the indelible marks of history”, (2013) Public
Law, 755–778, at 755 and 767.
77. The demanding legal framework of the ECI has been facing criticism since the drafting
of the ECI Regulation.
78. Case T-561/14, One of Us, pending; the organizers’ arguments, which are discussed in
this section, can be found at European Centre for Law and Justice, “Application to the General
Court of the European Union in the case of European Citizens’ Initiative ONE OF US and
others versus the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament”,
<www.eclj.org/> (last visited 2 June 2016).
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challenging the Commission’s refusal to act on their ECI’s proposals,
requesting the annulment of the relevant Commission’s Communication.
The bone of contention in the case brought by “One of Us” against the
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council, is the interpretation
of Article 10 of the ECI Regulation, which sets out the details of the ECI’s
examination stage vis-à-vis Article 11(4) TEU. The core of the applicants’
arguments concerns the discretion of the Commission to decide the follow-up
to an ECI. According to the applicants, the Commission infringed both Article
10(1)(c) of the ECI Regulation and Article 11(4) TEU by failing to submit a
proposal for a legal act. It is also argued in the case that, if Article 10(1)(c) is
found not to oblige the Commission to submit a legislative proposal based on
a successful ECI, then the ECI Regulation is incompatible with the Treaties,
and should be annulled. The Commission’s Communication is also being
challenged on a procedural ground: the organizers submit that the
Commission did not adequately substantiate the reasons behind its final
decision.
In essence, the applicants contend that the only way to ensure that the ECI
is a meaningful instrument of citizens’ participation is to interpret the ECI
Regulation as obliging the Commission to transmit a successfully submitted
ECI to the European Parliament and the Council by default. The applicants
claim that allowing the Commission absolute leeway for the purposes of an
ECI’s follow-up is out of proportion with the effort, time, and money spent by
organizers collecting one million signatures.79 The applicants further submit
that “it is unthinkable that an administrative body like the Commission would
have the right to adopt a decision that, based on that body’s institutional
self-interest rather than on sound legal reasons, supersedes a legislative
proposal directly and explicitly endorsed by more than one million citizens”.80
The “One of Us” organizers’ statement appears to undermine the role of the
Commission, downgrading it to that of a mere administrator of successful
ECIs. An alternative view would point out the Commission’s power of
legislative monopoly under Article 17 TEU. Even when the European
Parliament or the Council suggest legislative proposals, it is the Commission
that takes the final decision as to whether to proceed with these suggestions.
Since the Commission is not merely an administrator of the proposals of the
European Parliament and the Council, why should it be perceived as such in
relation to a successful ECI?
The case illustrates several matters of controversy concerning the
examination of successfully submitted ECIs, including the factors to be
79. “One of Us” reply to the Commission’s defence in CaseT-561/14 (Luxembourg, 14Apr.
2015), paras. 3–4 (document on file with author).
80. “One of Us” Application, cited supra note 78, para 177.
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considered by the Commission in its final decision; the purpose of the ECI
mechanism; and, the quality of reasons given by the Commission. Regardless
of its future outcome,81 the case is a prime example of the mismatch between
the expectations of ECI organizers and the way in which the ECI has
manifested in practice as a mechanism to influence EU lawmaking.82 In
contrast to the expectations of organizers, the analysis of the three successfully
submitted ECIs has illustrated that an ECI, which has the support of a minority
of EU citizens, cannot automatically surpass the multiple considerations to
be taken into account by the Commission in proposing and drafting
legislation.
In what can be perceived as an attempt to address this mismatch,
the Ombudsman and the Commission have recently sought to highlight
the political aspect of the ECI vis-à-vis its actual legislative impact.
The Ombudsman has suggested that the Commission should articulate “more
clearly for citizens its understanding of the value of the public debate
generated through the ECI procedure and of how this debate and irrespective
of the individual outcome, gives the ECI process value and legitimacy”.83
The Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans recently committed to
increasing the capacity of the ECI to foster public debate.84 Yet, despite Mr
Timmermans’ pledge, neither he, nor the Commission’s 3-year Report on the
ECI, specified how this can be done. In fact, in the discourse of the EU
institutions on the ECI, the aspiration to “enhance public debate” seems
unsupported by any suggestions for procedural changes and thus comes across
as a vague notion.85
Indeed practice so far indicates that not all ECIs started with the aim of
reaching one million signatures; some were used to get media publicity.86
Others were more focused on creating networks and fostering public
81. We should note here that the admissibility of “One of Us” before the Union courts is
doubtful, especially if one considers recent judgments concerning petitions to the EP. In
Schönberger and Tegebauer, the ECJ and GC confirmed that, since the EP Petitions Committee
retains full political discretion in its examination of a petition, its final conclusions are not
reviewable. See Case C-261/12 P, Schönberger v.European Parliament, EU:C:2014:2423; Case
T-308/07, Tegebauer v. European Parliament, EU:T:2011:466.
82. For a similar reference to a mismatch between what the ECI is and what citizens, media
and stakeholders think it is, see Berg and Glogowski, “Heavy stones in the road: The ECI in
practice” in Conrad, Knaut and Bottger, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 199–219.
83. Decision of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry
OI/9/2013/TN concerning the European Commission, 4 Mar. 2015, para 21.
84. Council, ITEM NOTE 9832/15, INST 200, (11 June 2015), 15.
85. See e.g. Draft Opinion of the Committee on Petitions for the Committee on
Constitutional Affairs on the European Citizens’ Initiative (2014/2257(INI)): “… believes that
the instrument still has the potential to engage the public and to promote dialogue among
citizens.”
86. Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 15.
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relations.87 For instance, for the organizers of the “High Quality Education for
All” ECI, the primary goal was to raise awareness of their objectives.88
In spite of the political rhetoric, the Commission, European Parliament, and
Council have not (yet) explained how such public debate can be further
promoted or supported in relation to an ECI. There have also been suggestions
to improve the communication channels between the Commission and ECI
organizers, to which the Commission replied that it currently has “no plans for
a new, formal and systematic form of dialogue with ECI organizers”.89
It is argued below that procedural improvements in the ECI’s follow-up
stage could address organizers’ current feelings of alienation; these could
demonstrate to citizens the multiple considerations that should be taken into
account by the Commission in proposing legislation; and would show that
there are benefits to campaigning other than legislative output (e.g. creating a
network or promoting ideas to the public). With this in mind, and in light of the
ECI’s current position in the EU institutional structure, it is worth examining
some suggestions for revisiting the ECI’s follow-up stage.
5. Revisiting the ECI’s follow-up stage: Some procedural suggestions
The process by which the citizens’ participatory attempts are evaluated is
crucial as to whether the outcome of the evaluation will be perceived as
satisfactory by the affected citizens: “Individuals are often willing to accept
outcomes they do not prefer if they believe the outcomes were derived through
a fair process.”90 Hence, even though anything shy of a legislative proposal
would probably be unsatisfactory for the organizers of successful ECIs,
procedural improvements to the follow-up of an ECI could mitigate citizens’
frustration with the end result. Most importantly, such improvements could
allow EU citizens to assess in a well-informed manner the evaluation of ECIs
undertaken by the Commission.
Against this background, the ECI’s follow-up process should become more
transparent and more open to a plurality of actors, interests, and views.
Increasing the transparency of the process would not only emphasize the
deliberative characteristics of the entire process. It would also demonstrate
the receptiveness of the EU institutions to a range of interests during the
87. Ibid.
88. “Feedbacks from ‘MEET ECI’ to own-initiative inquiry OI/9/2013/TN into the
functioning of the ECI procedure”, <www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.face
s/en/53306/html.bookmark> (last visited 10 June 2016).
89. Council, ITEM NOTE 9832/15, INST 200, 11 June 2015, 7.
90. Carman, op. cit. supra note 76 at 736; see also Marxen, op. cit. supra note 3.
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legislative procedure and hence when examining an ECI. Simultaneously, it
would oblige the Commission to clarify the source of interests that are
contrary to the interests promoted by an ECI not only at the final stage of
issuing its Communication, but also earlier in the ECI process. Opening up the
ECI’s follow-up stage to further transparency would expose EU citizens to
both sides of the debate on the subject matter of an ECI.
Modifying the ECI’s follow-up stage could entail an increased involvement
of the Parliament and the Council in the decision of whether to proceed on an
Initiative’s proposals. It has been argued, for instance, that a successfully
submitted ECI should automatically lead to a legislative proposal by the
Commission, which would be immediately transmitted to the Parliament and
the Council for voting. A vote by the Parliament and the Council in favour of
the ECI would then oblige the Commission to submit a formal proposal for a
legal act. According to this position, adjusting the Commission’s obligations
to encompass the drafting of a legislative proposal would tally with the
Commission’s increased exposure to citizens’ participation and would ensure
that the ECI is a meaningful and rewarding participatory mechanism.91
Nevertheless, a formal and binding obligation on the Commission to submit
a legislative initiative based on an ECI would be incompatible with the express
wording of the Treaties, the ECI Regulation, and the existing institutional
balance. Moreover, there has been no indication by the Commission of any
formal or informal move towards a more binding character for the ECI. In its
3-year Report on the ECI, the Commission merely referred to the need for a
more structured examination of a successfully submitted ECI and more
extensive involvement of the ECI organizers in the follow-up of their
initiative.92 In its recent response to the European Parliament’s Resolution on
the ECI, the Commission explicitly refuted any possibility for such major
restructuring of the ECI follow-up stage.93
In the Resolution, the European Parliament seemed eager to revisit the
follow-up stage. It urged the Commission to revise the wording of Article
10(1)(c) of the ECI Regulation to allow for “proper follow-up” to a successful
ECI, and urged it “to start preparing a legal act on successful ECIs within 12
months after issuing a positive opinion”.94 During the drafting of the
Resolution, György Schöpflin, the AFCO Rapporteur for the ECI, even
91. See Bouza Garcia, op. cit. supra note 28.
92. Commission Report on ECI, cited supra note 30, 15.
93. European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on the
European Citizens’ Initiative (2014/2257(INI)), P8_TA(2015)0382), 2 Feb. 2016, <www.euro
parl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2014/2257(INI)#tab-0>
(last visited 19 Dec. 2016).
94. European Parliament Resolution of 28 Oct. 2015 on the European Citizens’ Initiative
(2014/2257(INI)), P8_TA(2015)0382, para 30.
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commented that “the object of the [ECI] exercise is to change EU law, because
that was the radical, original dimension that the ECI was supposed to bring
about. That there is to be another body – citizens – that can initiate legislation
in the EU”.95
In the view of the Commission, however, “the current rules already ensure
an efficient and proportionate mechanism that fully reflects and respects the
Commission’s right of initiative”.96 We have seen that the rules allow for
utmost discretion to the Commission regarding its final decisions. The
Commission’s statement, however, seems to overlook the other, main players,
in the follow-up of an ECI: citizens, and their perception of the Commission’s
decisions. Having safeguarded its prerogative of legislative initiative, the
Commission should now be turning its attention to ensuring that the
justifications of its follow-up decisions are not seen as arbitrary and
capricious, and undermining the (successful) ECI. Extending the examination
stage to include the formal input of the European Parliament – the only
directly elected EU institution – would have been a good way to increase the
credibility of the ECI.
Given that the option of a parliamentary vote is not on the table, an
alternative suggestion would be to open up the examination stage of the ECI to
input from the European Parliament in a less formalistic way. In line with the
Ombudsman’s suggestion, the Parliament – and potentially the Council –
could provide their opinions on the existence of political support for an ECI
before the Commission drafts its final Communication.97 Taking the
Ombudsman’s suggestion one step further, it is equally important that
consultations with the two co-legislators are published. This practice would
mean more transparency for the benefit of ECI organizers, signatories, and
citizens alike. It would thus bring the EU decision-making process closer to
the public, as it would expose citizens to the fact that the Commission often
does not decide matters in isolation, but that its decisions respect (or, at least,
should respect) the views of the citizens’ democratically elected
representatives.
The above modifications to the ECI process would also be an additional
incentive for the Commission to take into account the views of the
co-legislators or to explain in more detail the reasons why it may choose to
deviate from them. Having said that, it is doubtful whether the Commission is
ready to take a step in the direction of re-allocating powers regarding the ECI.
95. ECI Campaign, “The European Citizens’ Initiative and the promise of participatory
democracy: Report of 16 June 2015 conference”, <www.citizens-initiative.eu/eci-confe
rence-full-report/> (last visited 10 June 2016).
96. European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament resolution on the
European Citizens’ Initiative (2014/2239(INI)), 2 Feb. 2016, 9. (supra note 93).
97. Decision of the European Ombudsman, cited supra note 83, para 17.
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In its reply to the calls of the European Parliament to consider the Parliament
also as a decision-maker for ECIs, the Commission argued that such an
expansion is not envisaged in the ECI Regulation.
By way of contrast, the Commission seemed more open to exposing the
ECI’s follow-up stage to a plurality of interests and views. It is relevant here
that, in the follow-up to successful ECIs, a number of groups condemned the
proposals of the “One of Us” and “Stop Vivisection”. These groups included
organizations that receive funding for stem cell research under Horizon 2020
and groups of scientists that support the utility of animal experimentation.98
At present, such actors that oppose an ECI are not given an official platform to
make their views known to the public. Changing the ECI process to allow for
more actors to vocalize their viewpoints on successfully submitted ECIs is in
consonance with the aspiration of the Commission and the Ombudsman that
the ECI should be an instrument for fostering public debate in addition to
being an agenda-setting tool.99 Both the Commission and the European
Parliament support the view that stakeholders with different views and
perspectives on the topic of each ECI should be heard during the public
hearings.100 Despite the merits of these recommendations for encouraging
public debate, the EU institutions should also be attentive to the unwillingness
of the ECI organizers to give their “moment of glory” (the public hearing) to
those who challenge their proposals.
With this sentiment in mind, public consultations on a successfully
submitted ECI could be an alternative option. Such consultations would also
chime with the provisions of the Inter-institutional Agreement on better
lawmaking, according to which the Commission should conduct wide
consultations during the period preceding the submission of legislative
proposals.101 This option, however, would require a review of the ECI
98. In an attempt to affect the outcome of the ECIs, these actors published their views online
and communicated them to the Commission and the European Parliament. See e.g. Wellcome
Trust, “Statement supporting funding for stem cell and reproductive health research in Europe
2014” <www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/Spotlight-issues/EU-affairs/Stem-cell/index.h
tm>; European Animal Research Association, “More than 120 organisations oppose ‘Stop
Vivisection’ initiative” <www.eara.eu/more-than-120-organisations-oppose-stop-vivisection-
initiative/> (last visited 9 June 2016).
99. ECI Campaign, “Timmermans personally commits to the ECI’s continuation”, 27 Feb.
2015, <www.citizens-initiative.eu/timmermans-personally-commits-to-the-eci-contitunatio
n/> (last visited 8 June 2016); Decision of the European Ombudsman, cited supra note 83,
paras. 17–24.
100. See EP Report on the ECI, para 31; European Commission, Follow up to the European
Parliament resolution on the European Citizens’ Initiative (2014/2239(INI)), 2 Feb. 2016, 10.
101. Decision of the European Ombudsman, cited supra note 83; Interinstitutional
agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the
European Commission on better law-making, 13 Apr. 2016, O.J. 2016, L 123/1, para 19.
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Regulation, something that the Commission has excluded for now but should
be kept in mind for the future.
Finally, another, more creative suggestion, which would not necessarily
require a revision of the ECI Regulation, involves the creation of a centralized
website or an electronic platform. The platform would publish letters received
by the EU institutions from organizations or groups of citizens who either
support or contest the objectives of an ECI. It could also be expanded to
include a deliberative platform for all ECIs, in order to allow website visitors
to comment on ECI proposals, thus enhancing the ECI’s presence on social
media. In this sense, such an electronic platform would go beyond the remit of
the current official ECI website that only presents information for each ECI
but does not provide any way for users to engage in a discussion.
In addition to supporting public debate, increased transparency of the ECI
follow-up stage would make EU citizens aware of the multiplicity of actors
and interests that should be weighed up by the Commission when deciding on
the follow-up actions to an ECI. The underlying argument here is that, “to
evaluate decision makers’ performance, citizens need to know the working
properties of alternative rules”.102 A more open follow-up stage would also
partly compensate for the lack of any voting procedure at the end of an ECI.
Since there is no way for the EU citizenry to vote for or against an ECI, there
should be a chance for supporters of both sides of the debate to be heard.
Stakeholders would thus become better able to evaluate the follow-up to an
ECI by understanding the complexity of the EU institutional structure and the
diversity of factors that should be taken into account when the Commission
and the two co-legislators decide on whether to proceed with a legislative
proposal on a particular policy area. Whether the Commission is ready for
such an increased level of exposure to the public is a different question.
6. Conclusion
This article has considered the development of the ECI in the EU institutional
framework and examined whether the ECI is a force of legislative initiative
capable of shifting the EU institutional status quo by affecting the powers of
the Commission to initiate legislation. Looking at the follow-up to the three
successfully submitted ECIs, it was demonstrated that the ECIs have not led to
legislation either because the Commission considered that there was no need
to propose legislative acts (“Right 2 Water”, “Stop Vivisection”) or because
the ECI’s proposals contradicted the objectives and purpose of legislation that
102. Bohnet and Frey, “Direct-democratic rules: The role of discussion”, 47 KYKLOS
(1994), 345.
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was recently adopted by the European Parliament and the Council (“One of
Us”.) An ECI can pressure the Commission to act only up to a certain extent,
whilst an ECI with objectives that are directly opposed to the agenda of the
European Parliament and the Council has fewer chances of resulting in
legislative proposals.
These conclusions are not categorical for future ECIs. They are, however,
telling conclusions not only about the ECI itself, but also about the ECI’s
position within the EU institutional triangle (Commission – European
Parliament – Council). The discussion has shed some light on the relationship
between the notions of citizens’ representation and citizens’ participation in
the EU or, put differently, the connection between Article 10(2) TEU and
Article 11(4) TEU. It was argued that the link between the two EU democratic
notions has manifested itself in two different ways. On the one hand, the
follow-up to “One of Us” has demonstrated the priority of the EU
co-legislators’ wishes over a proposal submitted by a successful ECI. On the
other hand, the European Parliament has also acted as an ally to some ECI
organizers, as seen in the follow-up to the “Right to Water”.
Indeed, the European Parliament has been playing the role of facilitator in
the overall ECI process since the adoption of this new participatory
mechanism. From MEPs attending the three ECI public hearings to
advocating changes to the ECI Regulation, the European Parliament has
attempted to present itself as a defender of EU citizens’ direct input in the EU
decision-making process. An additional example of this approach is the
European Parliament’s role in the continuation of ECI campaigns that did not
manage to collect the necessary signatures. One of these ECIs, namely “End
Ecocide”, was presented to the PETI Committee as a petition in February
2015, an outcome that was received positively by the ECI organizers. The
“End Ecocide” representative stated: “For us, it was important to be able to say
to our signatories that their efforts were not wasted, that at least our issue is
being discussed at the European Parliament.”103
By exposing the close link that is being developed between the European
Parliament and ECI organizers, but also the result of clashes between ECI
proposals and the position of the European Parliament on a given subject, this
article illustrated the way in which citizens’ participation via the ECI
complements representative democracy as a source of citizens’ input in the
decision-making system of the EU.
103. “Hearing of the ECI ‘End Ecocide in Europe’ supported by over 182,000 citizens as
petition in the European Parliament”, <www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/doc
uments/peti/dv/endecocidepetitionforconsiderationbyep_/endecocidepetitionforconsideration
byep_en.pdf> (last visited 10 June 2016).
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Finally, the contribution has identified a mismatch between the
expectations of citizens from the ECI and the ECI’s capacity to lead to
legislative output. In order to mitigate the risks to the credibility of the ECI
that arise from this mismatch, some suggestions were made for procedural
changes that would increase the transparency of the ECI’s follow-up stage and
enhance the deliberative character of the ECI. It was argued that taking such
steps would both facilitate public debate and communicate to EU citizens the
different interests that come into play when deciding on the follow-up of an
ECI. In this way, citizens would be given a more accurate picture of what
should be expected from launching an ECI.
The Chairwoman of the European Parliament Constitutional Affairs
Committee recently commented that “we have not yet quite absorbed this new
reality in which citizens are co-equal to the European Parliament and the
Council with respect to asking the European Commission to initiate a
legislative proposal which is, in fact, a Copernican Revolution in the European
institutional landscape”.104 Our present analysis has demonstrated that, if the
ECI was ever intended to be a Copernican revolution in the EU institutional
landscape, it has not yet shown its teeth. Currently, the ECI has not shifted the
EU’s institutional dynamics towards an enhanced position in EU
agenda-setting for the organizers and supporters of an ECI. Frustration and
disaffection of citizens with the EU institutions – and particularly with the
Commission – have been some of the side-effects of the ECI as a participatory
experiment.
Despite the conclusions regarding the ECI’s potential to affect legislative
output, the Commission’s statement that “it is still too early to assess the
long-term impacts of the ECI on the EU institutional and legislative
process”105 retains some traction. This is especially the case given that there
are ongoing actions by the Commission with regard to “Right to Water” and
“Stop Vivisection”, and the case brought by the organizers of “One of Us” is
still pending before the General Court. New ECIs have been registered in the
past year, whilst some of the unsuccessful ECIs, such as “End Ecocide” and
“Unconditional Basic Income”, are continuing their campaigns by becoming
federations, NGOs, or other forms of organized entities which could
eventually have an indirect impact on EU policy. Future research will identify
the lasting effect of these first few ECIs on the EU’s legislative and
institutional landscape.
104. “Parliament gearing up for European Citizens’ Initiative review”, <www.euractiv.
com/section/public-affairs/news/parliament-gearing-up-for-european-citizens-initiative-revie
w/> (last visited 8 June 2016).
105. Commission Report on ECI, cited supra note 30, 16.
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To conclude, expectations surrounding the ECI should be realistic. The ECI
is certainly not adequate on its own to address the feelings of alienation and
euroscepticism that have been fostered among EU citizens in the aftermath of
the latest political challenges facing the EU, the most recent being the outcome
of the “Brexit” referendum. Whether the recent vote of the UK to leave the EU
will lead to reform or institutional changes at the EU level remains to be seen.
For now it can be concluded that, if the aim is to avoid letting the ECI turn into
an unused instrument, and helping it develop as a mechanism that channels the
voices of EU citizens, ultimately the Commission will have to find a balance
between keeping intact its monopoly of legislative initiative and
communicating the message to EU citizens that their ECIs have had some
impact at the EU level, or at least that their objectives have been carefully
considered under transparent procedures.
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